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Abstract:
This thesis addresses the modern adaptations of human societies in response to environmental
crises during the times of Covid-19 and climate change. As humans continue to inflict
destruction on the planet and each other, we must understand human adaptation as a response to
human action and treat this action as one equal to the forces of nature. Chapter 1 discusses the
concept that human action has evolved to be as powerful as nature in terms of destruction and
catastrophic consequences on human society. This chapter addresses relevant data on the
magnitude of human consequences, in the context of Covid-19 and climate change, and
considers the histories of human destruction. Using an anthropological lens, chapter 2 analyzes
the inefficiencies of human adaptation and discusses that humans tend to adapt with resistance in
reaction to crisis, rather than prepare resilient strategies for that crisis. Chapter 3 addresses the
weak international systems and politics that respond to these environmental crises (i.e.
Coronavirus and climate change) and suggests that these systems were not built for long-term,
international cooperation. Moreover, these systems typically offer resistant, reactionary methods
and do not promote preventative, long-term adaptations. Chapter 4 focuses on the inequalities
and injustices that follow sporadic and regional adaptations, specifically comparing more
developed and less developed countries, arguing that without the structure of functioning
international systems, humans will adapt regionally and often face social, political, and economic
inequality. And finally, Chapter 5 offers recommendations for the future of adaptations,
explaining that it would be more productive if humans relied on preparedness and resilience
rather than resistance.
Keywords: Adaptation, Covid-19, climate change, international systems, environmental crises,
resilience, catastrophe, security, resistance, mitigation.
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Introduction: Art in the Anthropocene: Envisioning life among crisis
When the bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki the history of the world was
changed forever. For the first time, the power of human destruction was displayed on the global
stage and humanity proved to have powers equal to the forces of nature. The following decades
saw immense technological, social, economic, and political advancement, both furthering the
evolution of the human race and increasing our destructive capabilities. Humanity has now
reached a tipping point in our history, one that requires the collective adaptations of societies not
just to environmental factors, but to the very consequences of human action. Many have called
this time the Anthropocene,1 a new epoch where human interaction can be seen on the Earth’s
geological timeline. And though there is much debate on when this geological age began,2 I find
a more interesting question be, how can we adapt to the age of humans?
The destructive capacities of climate change and Covid-19 pose dangerous threats to the
survivability of our species and humans must learn to live in a state of crisis. As a result, people
around the world are beginning to imagine these futures and exhibit our daunting realities in
unique and profound ways. One such artist, Mary Mattingly, exhibited her perception of life in
the Anthropocene if humans do not adapt accordingly to the consequences of humanity. Mary
Mattingly is a Brooklyn-based artist who combines photography, performance art, sculpture, and
architecture to create poetic representations of human adaptation and survival in a world rocked
by climate change and an evolving environment.3 Her work is both a commentary and critique of
human-environmental relationships and exhibits the dramatic consequences of human-based
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environmental degradation.4 What is most interesting about her work is her understanding of
anthropogenic consequences and the seemingly human acceptance of those consequences.
Her most striking work comes from her collection “Home and Universe”, a series of
images that capture the weight of individual and communal consumption, reflecting on the life of
objects and their impacts on ecosystems. Mattingly explains that her inspiration for this
provocative piece came from looking introspectively at her own ecological footprint.5 As a
woman living in a consumer-based society, Mattingly became distressed at her way of life and
her contributions to U.S. environmental degradation. In “Home and Universe”, Mattingly
gathered all of her possessions and combined them into seven separate sculptures wrapped in
twine, built in a way that could be rolled or pushed. She then took these seven “balls of twine” to
various locations and illustrated the weight of carrying her environmental impact with her
wherever she went.6
Her work is a prime example of Art in the Anthropocene,7 a shift towards environmentalbased expression as many begin to grapple with human survivability in this rapidly changing
world.8 Mattingly’s collection addresses key themes of the Anthropocene: human-based
destruction, societal adaptation, and the efforts to continue normalcy in the face of crisis. It can
often be difficult to envision the consequences or “weight” of human existence on our shared
world, yet, Mattingly’s depictions on the life of objects, from extraction to disposal, pushes
viewers to reevaluate the prioritization of human domination and asks society to consider simple
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and adaptable strategies for survival, rather than continuing those destructive tendencies or
methods that eventually crush humanity beneath the weight of our own destructive capabilities.

Figure 1. Home and Universe, Mattingly, 2013.

Figure 2. Home and Universe, Mattingly, 2013.

Mattingly’s work exhibits that to live in the Anthropocene is to accept that humans have
the power to destroy themselves, but to survive in the Anthropocene is to understand how we
adapt to the consequences of human action will be the key to ensuring a livable future. That is
what this paper will address: the complexities of adapting to crises that we created when our
understanding of those crises is limited, specifically in the cases of Covid-19 and climate change
where their impacts are constantly evolving. I argue that current methods of adaptation are illequipped to handle ongoing and future human-induced environmental destruction, and require a
reevaluation if we are to increase the survivability of society. The first chapter describes the
transformation of human destructive capabilities, from the rise of humanity to Covid-19 and
climate change, arguing that human disasters have matched the forces of nature. Chapter 2
provides an anthropological perspective on human adaptability, focusing specifically on the
shortcomings of resistance adaptation. Resistance, in this context, refers to reactionary adaptive
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methods that are less efficient and effective than resilient adaptive strategies. The following
chapter discusses inapt international systems and ultimately argues that these systems are not
equipped to handle global adaptation and will contextualize their strategies through the lens of
Covid-19 and climate change. Chapter 4 analyzes the inequalities that follow adaptation,
highlighting the environmental injustices of adapting under an unequal system. The final chapter
provides my recommendations, both on a structural and personal level, to adapting more
efficiently to human-caused environmental disasters through prioritizing resilience over
resistance.
Chapter 1: A History of Destruction: Humanity as a Force of Nature
On August 6th, 1945, over 120,000 people were killed in the Hiroshima and Nagasaki
disasters. This disaster was not the result of a natural phenomenon, rather it was the consequence
of immeasurable human destruction that had never been seen on such a scale. When the United
States dropped two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, a stain of human destruction was
left on the geological and historical records that will remain for centuries. In the blink of an eye,
hundreds of thousands of lives were erased or changed forever, all stemming from the impacts of
human disaster.
It is widely accepted that humans have made a significant impact on the environment, but
it is the degree of that impact that is often contested among academic circles. Debates
surrounding the validity that humans have evolved to become equal to the forces of nature are
becoming increasingly popular, especially as societies examine the human influence on climate
change and Covid-19. Decades of human-based destruction and force have resulted in the
complete devastation of livelihoods and ecosystem services, most notably the loss of biological
controls (Covid-19) and provisioning, habitat, and cultural services (climate change). This
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chapter analyzes the progression of that human force, from the Rise of Humanity to modern-day
environmental disasters, and argues that the ability of the human race to destroy the environment,
ecosystem services, and itself, has reached a point that is equal to, or possibly surpasses, the
powers of nature.
The Rise of Humanity. The Rise of Humanity is largely attributed to the natural evolution
of human intelligence and humanity’s ability to adapt efficiently to an ever-changing
environment. Biologically, humans are some of the most advanced species on the planet, but not
because each individual is particularly astonishing, rather it is the collective of human
intelligence and cooperation that makes human society some of the world’s most destructive
forces.9 The history of human destruction began in ancient hunter-gatherer societies when
humans began modifying landscapes through the use of fire.10 The introduction of this new tool
allowed humans unparalleled influence within the natural world as it could be used as a form of
predation and protection that was completely unavailable to any other species. This advantage
over other species placed humans as apex predators, allowing them increased access to more
nutritious foods that ultimately resulted in the hominid brain size nearly tripling, “up to an
average volume of about 1300 cm3, and gave humans the largest ratio between brain and body
size of any species”.11 The genetic and social evolution of early humans enhanced their ability to
manipulate and manage the environments in which they lived, however, their impacts on the
natural world were still well within the boundaries of natural variability. Meaning, while they
could contribute to the changes of natural systems, they had not yet acquired the ability to alter
environments, thus generating unrecognizable landscapes.
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The Agricultural Revolution. Once humans mastered the manipulation of natural
resources, societies across the globe took part in the Agricultural Revolution, the first major
alteration of atmospheric greenhouse gasses (GHGs) and a period of extreme population growth.
The Agricultural Revolution is often considered the birth of humanity, as it made the activities of
hunting and gathering almost obsolete, completely changing the dynamics of society. Further,
the sheer size of human society has grown exponentially since the Agricultural Revolution as
“agriculture reduced the amount of land needed to support each person by a factor of a hundred,
allowing large permanent settlements to develop, which began to unite together into states”.12
Now, civilizations were not only cooperating for means of survival, but societies were also
expanding their intellect and exploring avenues of science, medicine, mathematics, architecture,
and technology. The increased cohabitation of humans allowed for the easier manipulation of
natural systems, but their impact still did not reach the same magnitude as the forces of nature.
Preindustrial societies lacked the technological advancement, economic organization, and
societal purpose to be able to match the effects of natural disasters. So, while their impacts were
apparent in various environments, they too remained within the confines of natural variability.
The Industrial Revolution. A few thousand years under established agricultural societies
and the expansion of scientific and technological knowledge led humans into the next great
period of anthropogenic change: The Industrial Revolution. It is often argued that the Industrial
Revolution propelled humans into the next great geological epoch, the Anthropocene. This is due
to the use of fossil fuels and the advancement of technology as it generated such substantial
change in the natural world. It was the invention of the steam engine that had a particularly
impactful effect on both human societies and their ability to destroy the environment. This life-
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changing advancement, and proceeding technologies, loosened the constraints of human
development and allowed humans more access to energy, a global economy, increased
population sizes, and more influence over the Earth’s systems. It was this era that saw the
greatest leap of technological development and human destruction of the environment. Before
industry, the effects of humans were local or transitory but remained within the bounds of natural
variables, the Industrial Revolution pushed those bounds to new limits and produced destruction
to the natural world that could be seen in instances of natural disaster.13 This destruction
manifested itself in many forms, whether that be increased deforestation, pollution, or habitat
fragmentation, but what really separates this era of human transformation was the production of
GHGs (see figure 3). The burning of coal and oil produced massive amounts of carbon dioxide
and methane gasses, dramatically altering the atmospheric composition of those gasses. The rise
in composition was so dramatic that our impacts could now be seen on the geological record,
though it was primarily in the form of carbon dioxide. It was the pollutive properties of the
Industrial Revolution that tested the bounds of environmental variability as the atmospheric
composition of GHGs became more unnatural, and it was this time period that allowed humans
to test their limits as an environmental force.
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Figure 3. The atmospheric changes of GHGs and the rise of human enterprise, Steffen, Crutzen, and McNeill, 2007.

The Great Acceleration and the Atomic Bombs. The Industrial Revolution may have
propelled society forward into the Anthropocene, but it was the dropping of the Atomic Bombs
and the Great Acceleration that solidified our position in the new geological epoch as destroyers
of the natural world. As previously stated, the atomic bombs that were dropped onto Hiroshima
and Nagasaki leveled the Japanese landscape and destroyed the natural and human environments
in ways humans previously could not imagine. The effects were so dramatic that the Japanese
victims did not have a word to describe the devastation that surrounded them. The only way they
could describe such horror was by using the Japanese word tsunami,14 as they equated the
aftermath of the disaster to a tidal wave or earthquake. The two bombs used on the Japanese
were also just a taste of what humans were capable of. The period of technological advancement
that preceded the end of World War II saw the development of thermonuclear warheads that
14
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could wipe out millions of people in one targeted hit. In this case, humans not only held the
power of natural disasters but were also leaving the limited capacity for natural devastation far
behind. Never has there been a natural disaster that could annihilate millions of people in a
matter of minutes, but now there are several human-made bombs that could produce those
horrifying results. The Great Acceleration saw humanity’s economic, societal, and political
advancements pushed to limits unparalleled to the thousands of years of human advancement.
Now societies prioritized “progress” and domination over the environment as well as each other,
and as the world became globalized and so did human disasters.

Figure 4. The mix of fossil fuels in energy systems at the global scale from 1850-2000.
Steffen, Crutzen, and McNeill, 2007

Modern Day Disasters. The history of human-motivated environmental destruction is
one of repeated mistakes and varying degrees of harm to ecosystem and societal health. It is also
one that is constantly unfolding before us, making it an observable catastrophe that has and will
continue to change the flow of human interaction and adaptation. Following the dropping of the
atomic bombs and the Great Acceleration, human-environmental relationships were irrevocably
changed as the capacity for human destruction moved well beyond the realm of environmental
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variability and human-driven natural disasters generated high-impact and sometimes irreversible
consequences. As of late, human-caused environmental disasters have absorbed news cycles and
worked their way into the everyday conversations in society. The remainder of this chapter will
discuss the two most notable instances of environmental catastrophe, Covid-19 and climate
change, as they have both surpassed environmental variability and propelled society into an era
of uncertainty and disarray, making our adaptations to them more important than ever.
Climate Change. When we think of disaster, we often characterize it as something
sudden, fast-paced, with immediate consequences. Disasters like the atomic bombs had impacts
that could be seen clearly upon impact, with imaginable, long-term consequences. The issue with
climate change is that it is a slow-moving event and its degree of impact is not only varying in
severity, its impacts can go unnoticed for decades until they have become permanent. For this
reason, it has been difficult to argue that human-induced climate change, and its proceeding
consequences, hold the same destructive capacities as natural disasters. However, in February
2022 the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), released a report finding
conclusive evidence that “human-induced climate change… has caused widespread adverse
impacts and related losses and damages to nature and people, beyond natural climate
variability”.15 Meaning, it should no longer be ignored or disputed that the mistreatment of the
environment has and will generate disasters to the same degree as natural forces. Further, the
report states with high confidence that the rise in weather extremes “has led to some irreversible
impacts as natural and human systems are pushed beyond their ability to adapt”.16 The damages
to societal and ecosystem health fluctuate across geographies, but their cumulative impacts have
generated human-induced natural disasters that will destabilize the balance of natural systems.
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Climate Change- Ecosystem Damages. As stated above, the rise in extreme weather
events has ultimately damaged the environment in ways that are either pushing the natural limits
of adaptation or have moved beyond those limits creating irreversible changes to ecosystem
health and services. A particularly important example of those damages is the loss of habitat and
biodiversity among ecosystems. The loss of climate regulation and rise in extreme weather
events, such as drought, flooding, hurricanes, or even by extension, the acidification of the
oceans, has either diminished the populations of once-thriving organisms or wiped them out
completely. Those that remain then face the problem of living in much smaller habitats as
droughts increase the desertification of regions, floods and hurricanes destroy ecological
communities, and ocean acidification strips aquatic ecosystems of their nutrient health.17 It is
important to note that these instances of environmental destruction are not unique to humanbased environmental change. Rather, it is the fact that these environmental changes are human
based that make these natural disasters so different from previous cases. Over time humans have
caused ecosystem collapse on a global scale, a force that was once reserved for nature, but is
now a force that has been obtained and unknowingly wielded by humanity. It is this force that
sets these instances of environmental degradation apart as human-environmental relationships
move beyond the realm of natural variability and push the limits of ecosystem adaptation.
Climate Change- Societal Damages The total impacts of climate change upon society are
vast and interconnected, much too broad to be discussed in one section of a paper. Therefore, this
section will briefly address two distinct aspects of climate change: water and food scarcity
(provisioning services) and increased migration (habitat and cultural services). The issues of
water and food scarcity and increased migration are the results of varying damages to ecosystem
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health, many of which can be attributed to the examples in the above section. Water and food
scarcity are oftentimes the consequences of drought, a disturbance to ecosystem health that can
be seen worldwide. Higher temperatures have led to decreased rainfall across the globe and that
lack of rainfall has depleted freshwater sources and caused the desertification of once arable
land. The rise in water and food scarcity is a further contributing factor to the increases in
migration seen across the globe. As communities lose access to clean freshwater and their food
sources become less and less abundant, many are choosing to flee their land in search of more
stable living conditions. Migration can also be a result of human habitat loss from flooding and
hurricanes, rises in zoonotic diseases (as will be discussed below), and increased environmentalbased violence as resources become scarce. These damages to societal health are far-reaching,
yet they can be attributed to the shared origin of human-induced climate change.
Covid-19. Unlike climate change, the Coronavirus pandemic falls more in line with the
typical description of a disaster. It is fast paced, almost immediately producing consequences,
generating global impacts, and permanently shaping the way humans interact in the world. It is a
disaster that has forever changed the way our society operates and sees the world, and it is one
that was ushered forward by humans. The unhealthy relationship between humans and animals is
the widely accepted origin of Covid-19, as humans engaged in the trade and consumption of wild
animals, greatly increasing the probability of zoonotic pathogen spillover and ultimately creating
a niche of human hosts for the virus.18 The virus then spread at a rate unforeseen in modern
history and the lives of every human on Earth were upended and dramatically altered as we
rapidly adapted to this unprecedented natural force. The Covid-19 pandemic is a prime example
of human-induced natural disasters, not only because of our interaction with wild animals, but
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because of the overall disastrous handling of the outbreak. This pandemic not only proved that
human destruction can move beyond natural variability, but it also showed us that we are illequipped to handle human-induced natural disasters.
Covid-19- Ecosystem Linkages. As stated above, the Covid-19 pandemic is a direct result
of deteriorating human-environmental relationships. Not only did the mistreatment of humanenvironmental relationships cause this global health disaster, it will likely be worsened by
increasingly poor environmental health further contributing to environmental degradation. The
loss of biological controls amid the pandemic is an unfortunate byproduct of the absence of
distance between humans and wildlife. Humans have always interacted with wildlife in some
form or another, but there has been a loss of separation between humans and wildlife, propelled
by the economic sector, that has diminished this natural barrier of space. Without adequate space
between humans and wildlife, there is a loss of the biological controls of diseases and a higher
probability of zoonotic spillover.19 The pandemic has also had negative impacts on overall
ecosystem health in the form of increased waste (predominantly single use plastics) and
reductions in waste recycling programs. As millions stayed within the confines of their homes
for months on end, societies saw an increased demand for delivered goods, resulting in a rise in
packaging wastes.20 Many were also encouraged to use single-use plastics, such as utensils or
food containers, to prevent the spread of the virus and promote personal hygiene, further
increasing total human waste. Disposable masks have become part of daily life, consequentially
filling our landfills, oceans, and ecosystems, and it is unlikely they will go out of fashion any
time soon. There has also been a dramatic increase in medical waste; Wuhan for example,
“produced an average of 240 metric tons of medical waste per day during the outbreak,
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compared to their previous average of fewer than 50 tons”.21 All this to say, there have been
some improvements to ecosystem health as there was a temporary reduction in transportation and
production pollution,22 but as societies attempt to slip back into normalcy, I anticipate those
emissions rising to record numbers.
Covid-19 Societal Damages. The damages of Covid-19 upon society are endless and ever
growing, however the most notable damages are the dramatic declines in mental health, ongoing
impacts to physical health, and the reorganization of society, though I will discuss that particular
impact in Chapter 3. Since the start of the pandemic in 2019, the overall mental health of
societies took severe hits as people were forced to isolate and quarantine in their homes. Human
interaction was limited to immediate family members or roommates and many experienced an
increase in anxiety, depression, violence, and insomnia. Several studies found that during peakpandemic times, children were more likely to develop acute stress disorder, adjustment disorder,
and grief and up to 30% of children experienced posttraumatic stress disorder after
quarantining.23 Further, studies show that young people in college felt an uptick in anxiety as
24.6% of students experienced increased stress due to the pandemic.24 And healthcare and
essential workers experienced the highest volume of mental health cases as 50.4%, 44.6%,
34.0%, and 71.5% of all participants reported symptoms of depression, anxiety, insomnia, and
distress, respectively.25 Beyond mental health impacts, the general physical health impacts were
felt worldwide and as of April 5th, 2022, there have been 499,119,316 recorded cases of Covid19 and 6,185,242 deaths as a result of the virus.26 Beyond case count, many have suffered what

21

Zambrano-Monserrate, Ruano, and Sanchez-Alcalde, 2020.
Zambrano-Monserrate, Ruano, and Sanchez-Alcalde, 2020.
23
Kontoangelos, Economou, and Papageorgiou. 2020.
24
Kontoangelos, Economou, and Papageorgiou. 2020.
25
Kontoangelos, Economou, and Papageorgiou. 2020.
26
“Who Coronavirus (COVID-19) Dashboard.” 2022.
22

19
scientists call “long Covid” or the persistence of Covid-19 symptoms as a result of organ
damage, post viral syndrome, post-critical care syndrome or other unknown factors.27 Needless
to say, the impacts of Covid-19 on societal health are vast and continuing to grow as we further
our understanding and interaction with the virus. Thus, it cannot be denied that this disaster has
moved well beyond natural variability and pushed society into what seems to be a never-ending
human-induced environmental crisis.
Chapter 2: An Anthropological Analysis of Human Adaptability
Human evolution has been dependent on our ability to constantly adapt to a changing
environment. Civilizations have more than proved that they can succeed at adapting to
ecosystems, however, our level of adaptability may become strained as we continue to use
inefficient modes of adaptation or resist the conditions to which we must adapt. Therefore, to
better understand the complexities and limitations of human adaptation, there must first be an
anthropological analysis of human adaptability. This chapter addresses the various processes as
well as the inefficiencies of human adaptation and argues that current focuses on resistance, and
therefore, reactionary methods are inapt if we are to survive the complexities and dangers of
climate change and Covid-19.
Adaptive Processes. Adaptation in natural systems is the product of a species’
adjustments to stressors that have emerged in an environment that in turn affects the inhabitants
of that environment, human adaptability is no different. For hundreds of thousands of years,
humans have undergone immense adaptation processes resulting in the overall evolution of our
species. These adaptations typically come in two forms: genetic and socio-cultural. Genetic
adaptation “involves changes in gene frequencies that confer a reproductive advantage to the

27

Raveendran, Jayadevan, and Sashidharan. 2021.

20
population in a particular environment”.28 In other words, a genetic adaptation is a physiological
response to an environmental stressor that can occur at both the individual and collective levels,
which will in turn elevate the survivability of a group. To a certain degree, genetic adaptations in
humans are characterized by phenotypic plasticity, or the ability to alter a phenotype in response
to an environmental change, therefore creating unique genetic adaptations that are dependent on
the environment.
Due to the human phenotypic plasticity, genetic adaptations have manifested through a
variety of physiological features, thus creating unique human traits that have been passed from
generation to generation. For example, humans that originated from high-altitude environments
have adapted impressively and relatively quickly to such harsh ecosystems. Adaptive qualities
primarily from the Himalayas and Andes can be seen through “markedly increased blood flow
and oxygen delivery to the uterus during pregnancy, substantially reducing the risk of babies
with low birthweight,”29 therefore increasing the survivability of the population. There is also
evidence that humans have adapted based on the climatic conditions of the environment. Most
notably, those who live in colder climates tend to follow Bergmann’s rule, having rounder
bodies, and Allen’s rule, having shorter limbs, therefore evolving to have “larger, stockier body
shape, presumably to improve thermal efficiency.”30 What will be interesting to see in the
coming decades is whether or not there will be advantages or disadvantages to such rapidly
changing environments depending on the varied physiology of humans. The loss of ecosystems
and the rise in temperature is sure to have an effect on human populations, and though we can
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develop socio-cultural adaptations quickly, genetic adaptations take generations to emerge which
in turn could have adverse effects on the survivability of humanity.
While it is undeniable that genetic adaptations are prevalent in human society, nongenetic
forms of adaptability are much more common among the species. Nongenetic forms of
adaptation are considered to be “cultural” or “social” adaptations as they generate shared
adjustments in the behaviors of several individuals instead of a singular organism. The primary
differences between cultural and social adaptations are in their application as “cultural
adjustments include a broad repertoire of knowledge about nature, including knowledge of house
construction, clothing styles, subsistence technology, and ritual”, whereas “social adjustments
mainly include forms of social and economic organization”.31 In this context, these adaptations
are merged to become “socio-cultural” adaptations as they work in congruence with one another
to create an infinite number of flexible adaptation varieties and therefore give structure to
changes in habitat and inter-human relations. These adjustments are considered the “shared
knowledge” of a given society and are passed on from generation to generation until the
adaptation becomes human nature. The adjustments that are made are based on three categories:
developmental, acclimatory, and regulatory adjustments. A developmental adjustment occurs
during the developmental period of an individual and yields irreversible changes to the
physiological tendencies of the organism.32 Acclimatory adjustments, on the other hand, occur at
any point after the developmental period and are considered to be physiologically reversible if
deemed necessary.33 A regulatory adjustment is by far the most common human adaptation and
is considered to be “more flexible than developmental or acclimatory adjustments because they
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involve less commitment from the physical organism and can be acquired promptly by learning
from others”.34 Each of these adjustments contributes to the adaptability of the human species
and humans have become dependent on these tendencies in order to survive in their evolving
ecosystems.
Genetic and socio-cultural adaptations offer two distinct insights into the mechanisms of
human evolution, though they reach a point of convergence when considering the environmental
psychology and preceding psychological adaptations of humans. These linkages between the
human psyche and the natural environment have always existed, however they were not
popularized in academia until Darwin’s theory of human evolution when he united the mental
and physical worlds of natural selection. His theory argued that humans evolved in part due to
the cognitive selection of mates based on both adaptive and non-adaptive features, meaning there
is a cognitive feature to selecting a mate that goes beyond pure instinct.35 In this way, human
psychology and adaptation are intertwined as humans are psychologically aware of their
reproductive, and ultimately, evolutionary choices. Therefore, if humans can be cognitive of their
evolutionary choices when choosing a mate, they may also be aware of their adaptive nature
when placed under environmental stressors. This argument surrounding the cognitive
environmental psychology of humans has expanded to many facets of the academic world,36 but
those pertaining to this topic involve the human reaction and understandings of climate change
and Covid-19, specifically regarding the limitations it places on our adaptive capacities, an issue
that will be touched on later in the chapter.
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Inefficiencies. The study of human adaptation is not a new concept, yet it is a rapidly
growing field as adapting efficiently becomes a more pressing matter. And while the adaptations
of humans are vast and have stretched across generations of societies, there are limitations and
barriers to these adaptations that have the potential to make them, and our understanding of
them, inefficient. When discussing the limitations and barriers of adaptation, there is a common
misconception that the two are the same, however, there is an important distinction that a barrier
can be overcome while a limitation places a finite constraint on adapting. In a study and review
of 81 research journals on modern human adaptation, researchers found that barriers typically
stem from three categories: “the individual actor, the policy or governance process of developing
and implementing adaptations, and the enabling and constraining context in which adaptation
takes place”.37 Further, these barriers are also influenced by the intended goal of the actor and the
context in which they occur. Meaning, what is a hindrance to one society or culture may not be
to another, making the nature of adaptations extremely dependent on the region in which a
society resides. For example, a barrier to climate change mitigation may be the fragmented
schools of governance in play when creating adaptive policy.38 When there are so many voices
involved during the creation of global action plans, many aspects of adaptation can be
overlooked, such as the water rights of a region or the land ownership of another, thus creating
barriers to complete and competent adaptive strategies.39 These barriers can be overcome
through increased discourse and a more holistic approach to policy, but I will save that
discussion for Chapter 3.
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As stated above, the limitations of human adaptation are more restrictive than barriers as
they prohibit the advancement of society due to both social and ecological factors. The
ecological limitations on adaptation are largely a cause of biological controls over humanity,
those controls include genetic and physical restraints. The more socio-cultural limitations on
adaptation fall under endogenous categories as they emerge from inside society.40 These
limitations typically fall under four dimensions of society: ethics and values, knowledge of crises
and consequences, risk assessment, and social importance of culture and place.41 The ethics and
values of a society determine its ability to adapt due to the ultimate goals of adaptation and “the
existence of diverse, and sometimes incommensurable, values held by the actors involved in
decision-making around adaptation can act as limits if these values are not deliberated”.42
Further, the values and ethical stances of those who hold the decision-making powers to adapt as
a collective also determine a society’s ability to adapt effectively as the few determine the social,
political, and economic outcomes of the many. And while it can be argued that the individual can
adapt independently, it is the social adaptation strategy that holds more weight in the grand
schema.
As previously mentioned in the discussions of the processes of adaptation, the shared
knowledge of society is integral in adapting and ultimately determines the success or failure of
an adaptation. A lack of knowledge therefore can limit a society’s ability to adapt, however, that
knowledge is purely dependent on the agent the society is adapting to. Meaning, if a society does
not have a robust understanding of an environmental stressor, for example, climate change, then
their capacity to adapt efficiently is limited as they can only adapt to what they understand. This
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can be argued as a barrier as a society can eventually acquire knowledge on that stressor, but
until that knowledge is shared between the individuals, it remains a constraint on their
adaptability.
The third socio-cultural limitation to adaptability is centered around risk assessment and
the collective decision to ignore and resist risks or diminish their significance as a threat. Even if
society has knowledge of a given risk, for example, Coronavirus or climate change, they may
choose to be complacent as they do not perceive that crisis as a big enough threat to use adaptive
strategies that change their way of life. Even if risks are prevalent, but there is no risk perceived,
then little if any action to adapt is undertaken and society becomes limited in their ability to
adapt to that stressor.43 This limitation has become increasingly clear in recent years as many
societies choose to ignore the dangers of climate change and Covid-19. This again could be a
result of the human inability to imagine a distant future as “the mind still works comfortably
backward and forward for only a few years, spanning a period not exceeding one or two
generations”.44 Further, the lack of adequate risk assessment and resistance to environmental
stressors could also be a byproduct of the school of thought of human exceptionalism: the
ideology that whatever problem nature poses, humanity now released from the traditional
confines of ecology, can generate any and all solutions.45 Placing the capacity of human
adaptation above or beyond natural systems has increasingly yielded poor results as humans fail
to adapt efficiently to Covid-19 and climate change. Our inability to grasp the scope and risk of
Covid-19 and climate change has limited the development of socio-cultural adaptations, and
ultimately resulted in a higher volume of environmental crises.
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The fourth limit to human adaptability is the value that societies place over the continuity
and survival of culture and place. It is important to note that “all societies have affective ties
between individuals, communities, and their material environments, and changes in the
environment affect individual and collective constructions of reality”.46 If a society cannot
imagine a reality without certain ties to culture, community, environment, and material resources
or possessions, then it becomes difficult to adapt to stressors that threaten those cherished
elements of life. Therefore, adaptation becomes limited within the eyes of the affected as they
can only progress so far as they can envision their culture’s survival, when in reality an
adaptation may require the abandonment of certain aspects of that culture.
Resistant Reactionary Methods. The above discussion on the limits and barriers of human
adaptation provides insightful evidence to the primary root of problems among modern adaptive
strategies, that of the resistance to environmental stressors. Adaptive resistance refers to the
human ability to avoid suffering significant adverse effects from potential threats,47 and in this
case those threats include the consequences of Covid-19 and climate change. Resistant methods
of adaptation are not as widely encouraged as they are practiced, meaning while policy reports
and organizations may promote more effective adaptive strategies, such as resilience and
mitigation methods, they tend to apply more resistant methods of adaptation. And it is truly the
application that counts when considering the adaptations necessary to increase the survivability
of humans in the face of Covid-19 and climate change. In the wake of environmental crises such
as these, resistance often transforms from actions taken to avoid that which threatens the security
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of an individual or system, and generates a purely reactionary response, one that is unlikely to
hold as an efficient adaptation to that stressor.48
In the case of climate change, resistant methods are most prominent when a given society
chooses to uphold the standards of normalcy rather than accept the immanent dangers of climate
change and make adjustments to combat those dangers. The term “global warming” was
popularized in the mid-1970s when Wallace Broecker introduced the idea of human-induced
climate warming in his research on atmospheric greenhouse gasses.49 Since then, climate science
has exploded, producing countless papers, studies, and policy recommendations on the most
effective ways humans could adapt to a global rise in temperature. Decades of research has
yielded clear results: humans have not only propelled themselves into an era of dramatic climate
change, but we must also adapt to those changes to secure the survivability of our society. And
yet, even with that clear understanding, we have done little to implement effective adaptation
strategies, instead resisting the dangers of climate change and continuing the unsustainable
methods that are attributed to climate change. This resistance to climate change is a result of the
four limits to adaptation discussed above, the most prominent being those of inadequate risk
assessment, and contributing human exceptionalism, and the inability to imagine a reality
without the survival of culture and place. The application of resistant adaptive processes stems
from a shared reduction in the risk of climate crises, as many of those risks will not be realized
for years and therefore are not seen as an immediate threat. Additionally, many believe that since
humans have moved beyond the realm of natural variability, they have the means to control or
even outsmart the most powerful forces of nature, a belief that is continuously proving to be
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untrue. Further, many would choose to prioritize the continuation of culture and place today
rather than make adjustments to those aspects of society that would create a resilient model, one
that could survive the future dangers of climate change.
The past two years have further exhibited the inefficiencies of socio-cultural adaptation
as many societies have chosen to resist adequate adaptation strategies to Covid-19. In the
beginning of the pandemic, adaptations were swift and widespread as many went into lockdown,
mask mandates were implemented, and the race to a vaccine began. And though these measures
prevented the spread in many areas, after a few months of quarantine many became weary of this
new “normal”. Barely a year after Covid gained a stronghold in the United States, several states
including Texas, Idaho, and Mississippi dropped their mask mandates and reopened businesses
to 100% capacity, despite the 30 million cases and 500,000+ deaths that had rocked the nation by
March 2021.50 By that time, the vaccine rollout was still at its inception and many countries were
months behind receiving any kind of dosage. And yet, many desired a preservation of culture and
a devaluation of risk over the safety and security previous socio-cultural adaptations provided.
Additionally, many chose to willingly ignore scientific facts about the virus and instead follow
the belief that the virus is a hoax, not dangerous, or not their concern, a decision influenced by
the ethics and values of a given region. Overall the socio-cultural adaptations to Covid-19 and
climate change have been stunted by the barriers and limitations of human adaptation. And while
society cannot entirely count on rapid genetic adaptation to combat these crises, societies can
learn from and choose to overcome those obstacles to socio-cultural adaptation and ensure the
survivability of the human world.
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Chapter 3: Ill-Equipped International Systems and their Environmental Policies
Since the spread of industrialization, anthropogenic environmental destruction has
become globalized, and those systems that both perpetuate and counter the security threats of
destruction have in turn become a globalized network of international policymakers. In plain
terms, these policymakers hold the power to dictate the future of human-environmental
relationships as they determine international and domestic regulations, bio/geopolitical systems,
and collective responses to crises. Therefore, the decisions of these international actors carry
immense influence over the greater international community, even if those decisions are weak
when considering the adaptability of international environmental politics. This chapter addresses
the weaknesses of these international systems and their consequential responses to environmental
crises.
What are these systems? There are several players in global environmental politics, the
most notable include nation-states, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), and multinational corporations. It is important to first discuss the
mechanisms and degree of influence of these players as they hold the most power over global
responses to climate change and Covid-19. Without these international bodies of governance,
adaptation would be too sporadic and leave little room for collaboration and cooperation. That
collaboration and cooperation should be more efficient and accountable, as I will discuss below,
but they at least provide a framework and foundation from which international adaptive
strategies can grow. And though each of these systems varies in influence and intention, the most
influential of all is that of nation-states.
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Nation-states are clearly defined, relatively homogenous communities that are
territorially bound to a sovereign area. Within the realm of international relations, they hold four
clear attributes— a permanent population, a defined territory, an effective government, and
internal as well as external sovereignty.51 And in the context of environmental politics, they can
adopt and implement economic and environmental policy, regulate trade, and decide what
environmental issues are brought to the international table.52 Oftentimes, these decisions are
swayed by popular domestic opinion, and therefore the culture, place, ethics, and values of a
particular state may hold immense weight over the greater globalized community. This can be
especially dangerous when a state’s position on a global environmental issue is reflected by the
interests of the dominant socio-economic elite,53 as is seen in many capitalist countries such as
the United States. Further, a nation-state can create, implement and expand international
environmental regimes, a regime being “a system of principles, norms, rules, operating
procedures, and institutions that actors create to regulate and coordinate action in a particular
issue area of international relations”.54 There are various roles in nation-state regimes and each
of these roles holds a vital position in international environmental relations as they ultimately
determine the global intention of environmental policy. That environmental policy then emerges
in forms of mitigation and adaptive strategies that can have both positive and negative effects
over the international community, a complexity that is especially convoluted in the context of
climate change and Covid-19.
Another actor in international environmental politics and regimes is intergovernmental
organizations (IGOs). An IGO is a coalition of representatives from member states that can take

51

“Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States”, 1933.
Chasek, Downie, and Brown, 2014, 45.
53
Chasek, Downie, and Brown, 2014, 45.
54
Chasek, Downie, and Brown, 2014, 32.
52

31
initiative and influence outcomes of global issues;55 The United Nations’ Food and Agriculture
Organization and World Health Organization are examples of some of the world’s most
influential and active IGOs. IGOs play a significant role in the decision-making process of
international policy as it is usually these organizations that bring global attention to various
issues. The United Nations Environment Programme, for example, “identifies critical global
environmental threats requiring international cooperation”56 and initiates negotiations between
states on international policy. Next to nation-states, IGOs hold the second highest influence over
human adaptation as they are one of the central points of strategy exchange, negotiation, and
hold the power of socially shaming nation-states on a globalized platform.
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) play a similar role in international politics,
though they are defined as having
“expert knowledge and innovative thinking about global environmental issues acquired
from years of focused specialization on the issues under negotiation… dedication to goals
that transcend narrow national or sectoral interests, and representing substantial
constituencies within their own countries and thus can command attention from
policymakers because of their potential ability to mobilize these people to influence
policies and even tight elections”.57
NOGs are considered unique as they tend to hold little political stake but can sway political
influence across transnational boundaries through their specialization in public awareness and
definition of environmental issues. Further, they can affect the overall adaptive strategies of the
international community because of their distinct influence among civilians. These international
players are explicitly designed by the shared knowledge, ethics and values, and culture of a given
region making them extremely specialized and targeted towards clearly defined issues. NGOs
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such as Friday’s for Future58 and World Wildlife Fund59 have become particularly important in
global environmental politics as they create new knowledge in the environmental activism field
and bridge the gap between local and international policies.60 This international actor varies the
most in scale, from tiny grassroots organizations to multinational efforts,61 but their size does not
diminish their importance as it is their combined volume that holds weight over environmental
policy.
The final international actor in international environmental policy is multinational
corporations, possibly the most dangerous threat to global adaptation. Multinational corporations
often oppose global environmental protections as they conflict directly with their economic aims,
and therefore attempt to influence policymakers to prioritize economic prosperity over
environmental well-being. Further, corporations often have “good access to decision makers in
most governments and international organizations and can deploy impressive technical expertise
on the issues in which they are interested”.62 Through the use of lobbying, buyouts, and tradeoffs, multinational corporations can sway political opinion over environmental policy, making
them a barrier to international adaptation.
Each of these four international actors holds significant influence over the nature of
human adaptation. Whether that influence is the result of the emission levels of a nation state or
the lobbied interests of a multinational cooperation, the consequences of these global actors can
be seen in nearly every facet of life. They are prevalent in this discussion not only because of the
power they hold over adaptation, but also because of the limits they place on the capacity of
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human adaptation. Each of these actors can be seen as a limiting factor or a barrier to human
adaptation due to their inability to act on the policies they work so hard to create. Rather than
following through with the adaptive and mitigation strategies designed to promote a resilient
international community, these actors respond with resistance to environmental crises, therefore
increasing the vulnerability of our global system.
How do they respond? This section will address the responses primarily of nation-states
and intergovernmental organizations, as they are the two most influential and reactionary
systems in global environmental politics. Traditionally, the overarching goals of international
political systems are to promote international security. Therefore, the notion of security implies
that societies are under a near-constant threat of danger,63 and must generate adaptive strategies
to combat that danger. This can become increasingly difficult when the security of a nation-state
is dependent on the actions of another, as is the case with global environmental change. The
globalization of environmental problems has created an interdependency between nation-states
that has grown with the rise of atmospheric change, and most recently with the pandemic.64 This
interdependency is key in understanding global human adaptation as the actions of one nationstate can hold immense positive and negative effects over another. Therefore, a nation-state can
respond in two ways: either it will react and adapt on its own, creating national environmental
policy, or it will coordinate their efforts with other nation-states, creating bilateral or multilateral
environmental policy.65 This policy will then be dependent on the perceived severity of the
danger, varying due to the longevity and proximity of the crisis. The United States, for example,
has created decades long adaptive strategies to climate change, but reacted almost immediately to
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the coronavirus pandemic. The adaptive strategies deployed followed both types of responses:
climate change strategies being more of a seemingly multilateral effort while Covid-19 policies
followed a national adaptive protocol, a difference I will discuss later in the chapter.
Intergovernmental organizations respond slightly differently to global environmental
changes, in that much of their job is dedicated to the research and knowledge growth of issues
and to make nation-states aware of potential and ongoing threats. IGOs also serve as mediators to
nation-state conflict and collaboration and can ultimately sway the opinions of member states.
They respond to environmental crises depending on whether or not they are a normative or
functional organization. A normative organization is one that was created due to a specific
mandate and is used to supervise a regime of international law, whereas a functional IGO exists
to perform specific, distinct tasks such as collecting data on changing weather patterns or
establishing migration transportation services.66 While they work in conjunction with each other,
it is the normative organizations that tend to be the leaders in crisis response67 as they aim to
create policy based on the findings from both functional IGO’s and their own research.
Normative IGOs therefore, respond with higher political engagement; they hold crisis
conventions, draft adaptive international law and policy, and seek to implement adaptive
strategies among nation-states.68 To put it in the context of Covid-19 and climate change, both
normative and functional IGOs act as the middle ground between nation-states and their most
important function is to generate policy output.69 That policy must be influential and practical,
for without that output the legitimacy and productivity of the IGO is questioned and they risk a
loss of funding from environmental regimes and individual nation-states.
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Why are they weak? The issue with international political systems is that many still
propose adaptive strategies that operate within the same schools of thought that created the
conditions under which we must now adapt. As discussed in the previous chapter, systems that
attempt to create resilient adaptive strategies often back out in the application process and
ultimately generate resistant adaptive responses. This reality is no different in the case of nationstates and IGOs. Too often are policies littered with language signaling towards resilience,
preparedness, and mitigation strategies when practices prove to support resistance. Whether this
is due to the economic interests of nation-states or the fear of going against the geopolitical norm
among IGOs, the results tend to be the same: not enough is being done to adapt efficiently and
effectively to environmental crises.
Take the most recent climate change adaptive strategies as an example; the IPCC has
released several reports in the past decade signaling towards immediate climate change
adaptation and mitigation policy.70 Yet, at COP 26 little was done to ensure that countries would
follow through with their promises to implement pro-climate practices. From an activist
standpoint, the outcomes of COP 26 were dismal. Leaders from around the world signed the
Glasgow Climate Pact, a series of decisions and resolutions that build on the 2015 Paris accord,
yet these decisions were not legally binding and did not stipulate the specifics of what each
country must do.71 And even those aspects of COP 26 that may seem like a win, such as the
emphasis on adaptation among less developed countries (LDCs)* and the primary goal of
keeping global warming at or below 1.5C rather than 2C,72 are nothing but empty promises in the
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absence of clear strategies for application and accountability among nation-states. The outcomes
of COP 26 are the latest in a long line of climate conventions seen throughout the 2000s, and if
we are to reflect on those past outcomes, the agreements of COP 26 will likely yield similar
results.

Figure 5. Current policy application is not on track to meet the Paris
Agreement goals, Carver, 2022.

Two of the most promising, and seemingly disappointing adaptive climate strategies
among international systems were the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Climate Agreement (PCA),
international treaties that not only acknowledged the dangers of human-induced climate change
but planned to take steps towards adaptation and mitigation. The Kyoto Protocol essentially
stated that 37 industrialized nations would reduce emissions by an average of 5% against 1990
emissions levels over a five-year period between 2008-2012.73 While this may have seemed like
a positive step towards building a resilient global community, some of the world’s biggest
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polluters failed to sign the treaty, therefore ensuring they could uphold their growing economies
and continue their polluting practices. Further, the Kyoto Protocol held fundamental design
flaws, most notably the short time frame meant that both “domestically and internationally,
[countries] could claim to be leading the charge on climate change without having to make
massive changes to policy or spending that might have stirred up domestic concern over other
countries free-riding on their efforts”.74 Ultimately, the Kyoto Protocol is widely seen as a failure
among international systems75 for its inability to deliver on adaptation strategies, and its
continued resistance to climate science. There was a clear disregard of the risk assessment agreed
upon within the protocol, and countries chose to prioritize the values and culture of their nation
over the survivability of that society.
The Paris Climate Agreement held similar weaknesses as the Kyoto Protocol as its
pledges and targets were seen as inefficient in meeting the desired goal of keeping temperatures
at a maximum 2C rise. The main problem is that the PCA was designed to be the first of many
steps taken to enact legitimate adaptation and mitigation strategies towards combating climate
change.76 But over the years, countries have proven that they do not intend to move beyond these
first steps, ensuring that the agreements signed in 2015 were not nearly as ambitious to keep
global temperature rise below 2C. Further, even if countries were to follow through with their
intended commitments stated in the PCA, global temperatures would still rise by 2.1C by 2100,77
creating irreversible damages to human and ecosystem health. The Climate Action Tracker78
found that under current policies and processes, we would see a rise in 2.7C, and if we
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implemented the adaptive and mitigation strategies outlined in the PCA’s 2030 plan,79 there
would still be a rise of 2.4C, both well beyond the threshold put in place by the IPCC. For the
PCA to work, countries would need to be legally bound to their promises and focus on producing
more ambitious plans every 5 years in order to stay within a 2C rise.
The Kyoto Protocol, Paris Climate Agreement, and COP 26 highlight the key weaknesses
of international systems when adapting to climate change, mainly that without a system of
accountability, nation-states will regress from their intended adaptive strategies and implement
resistant policy and action. Without legally binding contracts and systems of punishment for
those who do not follow through with their climate promises, nation-states can do whatever they
please and IGOs have no means of holding them truly accountable. In the face of such an
inevitable threat, it is vital that policymakers understand the gravity of our situation and see that
inaction is just as powerful as action. In the words of Donald Rumsfeld, “there are no knowns.
There are things that we know that we know. There are known unknowns. That is to say, there
are things that we now know we don’t know. But there are also unknown unknowns- things we
don’t know we don’t know.”.80 We know that we are in a climate crisis, and we know that there
are unknown consequences to our lack of effective adaptation, but it is the unknown unknowns
that I believe will shake humanity to its core and force adaptation to preserve the longevity of
society.
As mentioned above, climate change adaptation policy has followed more of a
multilateral process of application, whereas Covid-19 adaptations favored unilateral, domestic
responses. As the virus spread from country to country, nation-states shut down sporadically
depending on the severity of the virus within their boundaries. The first to implement drastic
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measures was China, implementing strict quarantine rules in early 2020 and shutting down much
of its economy.81 Many countries followed, fist placing travel bans over various countries with
high case counts and many shutting down their own borders in the hopes to prevent further
transnational spread.82 Over the past two years nations have responded uniquely to this
international environmental crisis, many choosing to adopt new societal structures, sacrificing
culture and place, and redefining national ethics and values. Other governing bodies resisted
long-term adaptation and preferred to continue living in a pre-pandemic fashion, downplaying
the risks of the virus and ignoring the factual knowledge on the dangers of Covid-19. This
unilateral method of adapting lead to the complete restructuring of many societies and a lack of
cooperation between nations. While IGOs such as the World Health Organization (WHO)
released scientific data on the dangers of the virus and the ways in which humans can protect
themselves from it,83 many societies preferred to continue life with some sense of normalcy,
putting themselves and members of their community at risk.
Chapter 4: Unequal Adaptations and the Environmental Injustice of Adapting
When the effects of environmental crises hit the globe, those effects are rarely felt
equally among nations. More often than not, countries that are affected the most have contributed
the least to environmental destruction, however, their adaptations will be of a greater scale as
they are on the front lines of the crisis. This ongoing issue presents humanity with a multitude of
environmental injustices as countries and regions face unequal adaptations in the face of
catastrophe. This chapter discusses the environmental injustices of climate change and Covid-19
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and subsequently advocates for international cooperation in times of global strain as countries
will be forced to adapt regionally and sporadically with the absence of responsible and equitable
international systems. Further, this chapter will touch on specific cases of unequal adaptations,
comparing the adaptive strategies and privileges of more developed countries (MDCs) versus
those of less developed countries (LDCs).
Climate Change (In)Justice. It is a widely accepted ideology that disadvantaged groups
are more susceptible to adverse effects of environmental crisis and degradation. The unequal
distribution of advantages is an example of global environmental injustice that will
disproportionately affect regions based on their political and economic power. The term
environmental justice refers to the “fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people
regardless of race, color, national origin, or income, with respect to the development,
implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies”.84 Within the
context of climate change and Covid-19, environmental justice becomes an exceedingly popular
topic as the unimaginable effects of these crises become a reality in vulnerable communities.
Environmental injustice in these contexts therefore becomes an issue of human rights as the
effects of Covid-19 and climate change become a series of chronic injustices and corrode the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.85
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In the context of the climate crisis, there has been ongoing development of a cycle of
inequality, one that promotes the unequal distribution of adverse effects of climate change and
the consequential adaptive strategies of disadvantaged countries. This cycle, as exhibited in
figure 6 “shows that the relationship between climate change and social inequality is
characterized by a vicious cycle, whereby initial inequality makes disadvantaged groups suffer
disproportionately from the adverse effects of climate change, resulting in greater subsequent
inequality”.86 Meaning, the more disadvantaged a group or region is at the onset of climate
change will suffer more devastating consequences due to their lack of economic (resources) and
political (state influence) power in comparison to less vulnerable communities.

Figure 6. Inequality and climate change vicious cycle, Islam, Nazrul, and Winkel, 2017.

The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs describes that this cycle
can be understood in three instances of inequality:
First, inequality increases the exposure of the disadvantaged social groups to the “adverse
effects of climate change” (“climate hazards,” for short). Second, given the exposure
level, inequality increases the disadvantaged groups’ susceptibility to damages caused by
climate hazards. Third, inequality decreases these groups’ relative ability to cope with
and recover from the damages they suffer”.87
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The remainder of this section will be dedicated to breaking down those three instances of
inequality and contextualizing them within the framework of adaptation, arguing that a reliance
on regional adaptation will result in the further promotion of climate injustice.

Figure 7. Three effects of inequality on disadvantaged groups, Islam Nazrul and Winkel, 2017.

Exposure. The exposure of a group tends to mean the location and physical nature of the
affected peoples. Those who are more vulnerable to the effects of climate change tend to
congregate in areas of increased risk, mainly rural areas that are susceptible to floods, drought,
rising sea levels, erosion, heatwaves, and increased salinity. Recent studies show that “a
significant part of the population in developing regions now live in “low-elevation coastal zone”
and 100-year flood plains, and their number is increasing in both absolute terms and as
proportion of the population”.88 Further, there is a larger concentration of disadvantaged groups,
such as pastoralists and ethnic minorities, that are living in arid, semi-arid, and dry sub-humid
aridity zones, who have a higher probability of experiencing water and food scarcity and adverse
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health effects due to a warming climate.89 Those living in these zones experience an unequal
exposure to environmental threats and must therefore adapt quicker and to a higher degree than
their more secure counterparts. Further, the absence of secure political systems and restricted
access to resources places limitations on both mitigation and adaptive strategies of these regions.
As a result, these societies may rely on more developed countries for support, again reducing
their adaptive potential and contributing to the environmental injustice.
Susceptibility. The difference in susceptibility between advantaged and disadvantaged
groups primarily stems from a group’s economic and social position, both domestically and in
the international community. Typically, a group becomes more susceptible to the adverse effects
of climate change if they are unable to diversify their assets, they cannot afford to move out of a
high-risk zone, they experience gender-based or racial violence, or they cannot adapt to a
changing market.90 It is not uncommon for disadvantaged communities to have their savings in
vulnerable housing stock (urban communities) or livestock (rural communities), which are both
susceptible to environmental disasters such as flooding or drought91, therefore placing their
assets and livelihoods at a higher risk. The global wealthy on the other hand typically hold their
assets in a more diverse fashion, thus increasing the security of their assets and ensuring that they
are not at risk of losing them in the event of a climate crisis. The economic position of many
groups also influences their ability to move out of high-risk areas and into more secure locations
as they often cannot afford to leave. Their inability to leave again makes them more susceptible
to both physical climate change damage (e.g. natural disasters) and negative health impacts.
Oftentimes, “people living in poverty are more susceptible to the diseases that many climate
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hazards help to spread, including malaria and water borne diseases”.92 Additionally, those who
experience gender and racial violence are more susceptible to the adverse effects of climate
change. Studies have shown that women are more likely to be vulnerable to the impacts of
climate change than men and it is not uncommon for climate change to create poverty traps in
various regions, further ensnaring women in undesirable locations.93 Race plays a key role in
susceptibility as the IPCC found that there is significant importance on the role “of social
positions of different groups in determining the impact of climate change”,94 typically due to the
entanglement of economic prosperity and racial or ethnic identity. It is often those of racial or
ethnic minorities, such as indigenous communities, that must adapt quicker to the effects of
climate change as they are on the front lines of the crisis and are therefore forced to bear the
burden of worsening conditions first. Finally, the economic prosperity, or lack thereof, of a
specific group can determine their susceptibility due to their adaptability to a changing market.
As the effects of climate change transform the market value of goods and resources, particularly
that of nutritious foods, lower-income communities may not be able to afford to feed their
families and therefore suffer food scarcity.95 Vulnerable communities are compounded with
many, in some cases all, of these biases and systems of injustice which consequently increases
their climate insecurity and prohibits them from adapting effectively.
Ability to cope and recover. How a country or region copes with and recovers from an
environmental crisis is the third pillar of inequality as this ability is ultimately determined by
their access to resources. Those resources include insurance, common property and social
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resources, and public resources.96 Access to insurance is possibly the most important because it
safeguards the capital of both nations and individuals in the wake of environmental destruction.
Disadvantaged groups, however, do not often have access to insurance and therefore cannot
protect both physical and human capital,97 resulting in the sacrifice of one or the other.
Disadvantaged groups also tend to rely more heavily on access to common property (i.e. shared
ecosystems that provide timber, sustenance, fresh water, and protection) or social resources.98 If
that property or good is damaged, they lose access to those ecosystem services and must adapt at
a faster and more efficient rate than advantaged groups, thus negatively affecting their ability to
cope and recover from environmental changes. Access to public resources is the other hindrance
due to the unequal distribution of welfare functions after environmental destruction.99 The main
issue with the allocation and distribution of public resources stems from the discrimination
against disadvantaged groups as they are less likely to receive aid from government systems in
the wake of crises.100 This discrimination can be attributed to race, class, or gender, but
ultimately yields the same result of environmental injustice.
The Differences in Climate Adaptation Between LDCs and MDCs. The varying degrees
of exposure, susceptibility, and ability to cope and recover have tremendous impacts on a
country’s capacity to adapt to climate change effectively. Traditionally, MDCs suffer far less
exposure and susceptibility and possess strong enough institutions that promote coping
mechanisms and recovery than their LDC counterparts. Yet, MDCs are the primary proponents
of human-induced climate change and force LDCs to suffer the adverse effects first and to a
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higher severity. As stated above, this is the key component of climate injustice, and researchers
are already seeing the effects of unequal adaptations.

Figure 8. Top 10 greenhouse gas emitters since 1850, Maizland, Lindsay, and Hill. 2021.

Figure 9. Top greenhouse gas emitters in 2018, Maizland, Lindsay, and Hill. 2021.

Climate Change Comparison. The disparity between polluting countries and nonpolluting countries has been growing for quite some time. Even since 1992 the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) declared that there were “common but
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differentiated responsibilities”101 when considering the effects of global pollution and recognized
that advantaged countries tended to be higher polluters with the added privilege of avoiding the
most dangerous consequences. This disproportionate allocation of responsibility created the “free
rider” versus “forced rider” problem, wherein “‘free rider’ countries contribute
disproportionately to global GHG emissions with only limited vulnerability to the effects of the
resulting climate change, while ‘forced rider’ countries are most vulnerable to climate change but
have contributed little to its genesis”.102 This means that countries like China and the United
States have become the winners of the climate crisis as they have the ability to promote their
fossil fuel industries with little perceived impact to their day-to-day lives, whereas many other
island and African nations must suffer more severe climate impacts.103 As a result of this issue,
MDCs have done little to contribute to global climate adaptations and have continued to follow
methods of resistance which have produced underwhelming results. In a comprehensive review
of the effectiveness of MDC climate adaptation, researchers found that while MDCs may
produce adequate adaptation and mitigation policy, it does not necessarily translate into
adaptation action. Thus, this inaction creates a “lack of political will to meaningfully address
climate change impacts, particularly at local levels where a mismatch between national
statements on adaptation and local action has been noted”.104
LDCs, on the other hand, are having similar issues as they produce adequate climate
adaptation strategies but are unable to deliver due to preexisting conditions of global economic
inequality and political instability. LDCs tend to be more vulnerable, due to higher levels of
exposure and susceptibility, and are less prepared for climate change damages as a result of their
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inability to cope and recover. On the University of Notre Dame’s Global Adaptation Index,105
LDCs tend to rank low on the vulnerability and readiness scoresheets. Countries such as Niger
(182:0.677, 131: 0.338), Liberia (177:0.605, 165: 0.280), and Haiti (152: 0.530, 182:0.238)106
not only hold some of the poorest ranks, they are designated as low-income groups among the
global community, making it far more difficult for them to apply their adaptive strategies due to
their weak economies. That is not to say that LDCs are not trying to implement and practice
adaptive policy despite these setbacks. There is a growing trend among LDCs to generate climate
policy that focuses on protecting agriculture sectors, preserving freshwater systems, and
fortifying healthcare systems through national development strategies.107 And while there is
progress being made, these countries would benefit from the reassessment of international
systems and treaties as well as increased accountability among MDCs. This is the greatest
disparity within the climate change conflict; on the one hand are MDCs, able but unwilling to
adapt and continuing methods of resistance, and on the other LDCs unable but willing to adapt
effectively and efficiently. Remedies to this problem will be further explored in Chapter 5, but
first a look at the environmental injustices of Covid-19.
Covid-19 Injustice. In April 2020, I recall someone had called the pandemic “the great
equalizer”, the first global crisis of my generation that would affect each and every person on the
planet in equal measure, because at that time, no one believed you could run from the virus. For
weeks I believed this statement as I watched community after community succumb to the virus,
wealthy and poor, old and young, urban and rural. There seemed to be a trend that MDCs were
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suffering higher losses, both of life and economic prosperity, while LDCs had lower case levels
and mortality rates.108 Yet, as the weeks stretched into months, and now into over two
years, it has become clear that Covid-19 may have temporarily equalized the globe, but it
eventually exacerbated preexisting global inequality and once again placed LDCs at social,
political, and economic disadvantages.

Figure 10. Measurement of loss of life in the context of GDP, Ferreira, 2021.

Similar to the injustices of climate change, the inequalities of the pandemic are a result of
LDC’s disadvantages in their ability to cope and recover, susceptibility, and exposure to the
virus. After the initial hits of the virus passed, it became increasingly clear that the pandemic
exposed the cracks in global inequality as LDCs were less equipped to implement virus
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mitigation and adaptive strategies due to their vulnerable health systems, lack of access to
resources that could promote economic recovery, and unstable or weaker political systems that
were unable to keep up with, or even participate in, the race for a vaccine.109 While MDCs began
to reopen their economies and implement widespread vaccine efforts, LDCs continued to live
under threat of the virus and economic collapse. Further, MDCs were able to implement
widespread socio-cultural adaptations such as moving education and labor to the virtual world,
allowing the continuation of childhood development and economic stability. LDCs on the other
had did not have adequate access to remote equipment and were either forced to stay home,
diminishing cognitive development in children and young people, or expose themselves to the
virus.110 Gender inequalities were also heavily exacerbated as women stayed home as full-time
caregivers for family members, removing them from education and economic opportunities and
furthering the gap for gender equality. Finally, MDCs profited from economic adaptive strategies
as many key world banks loosened monetary policy and injected enormous amounts of liquidity
into financial markets.111 That additional liquidity helped keep assets high and ultimately,
inflated the value of assets held primarily by rich people and had a lot to do with the generalized
growth of billionaire incomes.112 All this to say, there are overarching themes in the globalized
inequality of environmental crises, and unless MDCs are held accountable and assist in LDC aid
and recovery, it is unlikely that the gap in efficient adaptation will close.
Chapter 5: Policy Recommendations
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This paper has illustrated that humanity not only has the destructive capacity and
capabilities of nature, but that humanity is unprepared to adapt to the consequences of human
action and is therefore ill-equipped for the tumultuous times to come. The dramatic effects of
Covid-19 and the growing effects of climate change prove that the international society is
unprepared for human-induced environmental crises and lacks the adaptive capability to survive
and thrive in changing ecosystems that are rocked by climate change and global pandemics. The
importance of understanding these threats and our subsequent preparedness for these
consequences has never been more pressing as we enter a tipping point in human history.
The adaptive strategies mentioned throughout this paper have highlighted some of the
key strengths and weaknesses of current adaptation policy and practice. Before I give my
recommendations on how humans can best adapt to climate change and Covid-19, I would first
like to point out those strategies I agree with. First and foremost, I am extremely impressed and
pleased with the amount of scientific research and literature I encountered during my findings,
primarily from those IGOs mentioned in Chapter 3. The reports from the IPCC Working Groups
are, I believe, especially useful in drafting effective policy and accurately placing responsibility
on international actors. International agreements such as the Paris Climate Agreement and Kyoto
Protocol, though lacking in application, are an excellent start to promoting an international
adaptive strategy to human-induced climate change and are nothing if not a framework for more
productive policy.
Recommendations: Climate Change
Wartime Mobilization. As stated in previous chapters, I do not find current adaptive
strategies to climate change efficient as many continue to resist the dangers of this growing crisis
and produce unjust results. The way I see it, there are two broad scenarios in which humanity
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could adapt efficiently and preserve enough of society to make civilization recognizable when
the large-scale consequences of climate change begin to take place. The first scenario is one of
rapid climate mitigation and the adoption of severe policies intended to minimize the impacts of
climate change. If countries were to immediately implement the strategies outlined in the Paris
Climate Agreement and those agreed upon during COP 26, then we may have a fighting chance
at keeping global temperatures below 2C. But to protect the majority of society and repair the
damages of existing impacts, governments must take stronger action in climate change
mitigation. One way of enacting such policy would be to approach climate change mitigation in
the same manner and capacity as governments approach war-time strategy. Climate change is
already becoming a national security issue,113 but what would happen if governments reacted to
changing temperatures as if they were waging a war on the very extractive systems that caused
this disaster? A method of wartime mobilization would have to occur if this scenario were to
become a reality. We saw hints of this mobilization during peak pandemic times, and I foresee it
happening if countries do not react to climate change in a swift, multilateral fashion.
Wartime mobilization is the practice of assembling massive amounts of resources and
deploying them in reaction to national security threats.114 Similar to the type of mobilization seen
during the World Wars, governments would have to treat climate change as a threat to
international security and restructure political, economic, and social systems. A restructuring of
political systems would give more power to international institutions in holding nation-states
accountable for their actions, or lack thereof, in climate mitigation. Thus, a power shift would
take place wherein IGOs would hold more power than nation-states and foster a broader, more
inclusive international community. Traditional economic sectors would also take a hit as the
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current international capitalist systems are far too extractive and promote the welfare of MDCs
over LDCs. Opportunities for restructuring include a focus on investing resources back into the
land that was used for over extractive purposes such as pastures and clear-cut farms.115 By
putting money back into the reestablishment of habitats, ecosystems have a greater chance at
recovery and could serve as eventual protections against climate change impacts. Finally,
restructuring social systems such as consumer-based societies or even promoting different eating
habits among MDCs could have tremendous impacts on the mitigation of climate change. By
reducing output of goods and services and forcing minimized consumption, societies would
engage in less extractive and polluting industries. Further, altering eating habits, such as
consuming less animal products (when they are not necessary for nutrition), would greatly
reduce GHG emissions and open up land for more sustainable activities. And while I understand
that these dramatic changes are ideals that many are familiar with, it is the process of application
that would require such a dramatic shift.
Using wartime mobilization strategies may be the most efficient, and ultimately, the only
way to implement mitigation policy before it becomes impossible to stop the most destructive
effects of climate change. Though, if this scenario is to be the most efficient it can be,
mobilization cannot be limited in a purely unilateral sense, rather, nation-states must work
together and utilize IGOs, NGOs, and multinational corporations to implement mitigation
strategies. If nation-states were to give more powers or resources to IGOs such as the UN
Security Council, those IGOs, with help from NGOs and multinational corporations, could enact
mitigation strategies across borders, breaking the traditional transnational boundaries and
creating a global community with more centralized power structures. Those power structures, in
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turn, can ensure that LDCs are given equal representation and require that responsible MDCs
contribute higher volumes of resources, human capital, and market influence in order to protect
the livelihoods of LDC communities as they would their own.
Accepting the Danger. The second strategy is one that is perhaps a bit more morbid, but
one I believe to be more likely. This scenario is dependent on the idea that society must accept
that we are, and will continue to be, living through catastrophic changes we are unable to stop.
This entails accepting that our day to day lives will become dangerous and that our actions will
be in a constant battle with the unprecedented dangers we are facing. That is not to say that
societies should welcome danger, rather it means that we should no longer resist climate danger
as part of our lives and work towards building a resilient global community.116 To build a
resilient society, there would usually be adequate mitigation strategies, but in the absence of
those strategies, resilience would be entirely dependent on how prepared societies are for known
dangers and how capable they are at adapting to unknown dangers on the fly. This scenario
would require a certain kind of understanding as humanity would accept that daily life would
have to be upended at some point with no guarantee that normalcy would resume. As explained
in Chapter 2, humans would have to become cognizant of this evolutionary choice: choosing to
accept danger and pursue the preservation of culture and space over the survivability of the
broader international community. The adaptive strategies necessary in this scenario would then
require a mix of preparedness and reactionary strategies, such as fortifying infrastructure against
increased flooding or quickly implementing migration transportation for displaced communities.
I say that this scenario is more morbid than the previous scenario because part of
accepting the dangers of climate change entails that we must also accept the losses that come
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with a catastrophe of this scale. The international community must be prepared to lose untold
numbers of communities, cultures, and our very way of life if we continue our resistance to
climate change. And though this scenario accepts those losses, it is vital that it does not prioritize
the losses of one community or culture over the other. Similar to the wartime mobilization
strategy, there would have to be a reallocation of resources in order to ensure there are equal
chances of survivability between MDCs and LDCs. This, again, would require that IGOs have a
higher degree of influence and power than is typically awarded to them, thus establishing more
equal structures of international governance.
Recommendations: Covid-19
The persistent lifeforce of the pandemic has allowed countries and the global society to
adapt in a variety of forms and functions, changing strategies based on the emergence of new
shared knowledge, the overall ethics and values of a nation or it’s governing body, the
preservation of culture, and the perceived risk of the virus. Over the past two years mitigation
and adaptive strategies have changed dramatically, from extreme lockdowns to vaccine mandates
and economic relief packages. To recommend policy adaptations towards our continued
interactions with this virus, these policies would have to be split between reactionary adaptive
methods and mitigation of future pandemics, though the two together would create an overall
resilient adaptation plan, promoting the survivability of the international community.
Reallocating Resources. The biggest failure of Covid-19 adaptations was our inability to
prioritize equity on an international scale, for many vulnerable communities were left behind in
the reactionary adaptive strategies. As discussed in Chapter 3, LDCs were and still are at a higher
risk of bearing the unequal burdens of Covid-19 due to their increased susceptibility, exposure,
and inability to cope and recover. And while many have learned how to handle the higher rates
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of susceptibility and exposure, several LDCs remain at a disadvantage to adequately cope with
and recover from the pandemic than MDCs. Therefore, current adaptive strategies must prioritize
aiding in the recovery of LDCs, both on socio-cultural and economic levels. Just as climate
change adaptation policy should give more power and influence to IGOs, Covid-19 strategies
should reallocate global resources and power to organizations that can ensure an equitable
recovery among LDCs and MDCs. Meaning, IGOs and NGOs are given increased political and
economic influence and have the ability to redirect recovery strategies from non-essential MDC
plans, towards necessary LDC aid.
Preventing Future Spillover. When SARS COV-2 jumped from bats to human hosts,
humanity experienced what is known as a “spillover”, or the transmission of diseases from
wildlife to human populations. The key aspect to preventing and mitigating future pandemics is
to prevent future spillovers, meaning humans must dramatically modify their interactions with
wildlife and the environment to protect both human hosts and ecosystem health. There are four
key policy recommendations to prevent spillover; rolling back on deforestation, limiting
international and domestic wildlife trade, reassessing animal agriculture ethics and practices, and
funding disease detection and control organizations.
About one-third of the world’s forests have been lost due to deforestation. This
devastating loss of habitable land has increased the interaction between humans and wild animals
as they are forced out of their natural habitats and assimilate to anthropocentric ecosystems. This,
therefore, increases the interaction between humans and wildlife, broadening the transmission
capacity of zoonotic viruses. Studies have shown that humans and livestock are more likely to
“contact wildlife when more than 25% of the original forest cover is lost, and such contacts
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determine the risk of disease transmission.117 This rise in contact consequently leads to a rise in
transmission and a higher risk of pandemics. A shift towards smaller scale farming or a reduction
in the consumption of livestock could have dramatic effects on the probability of another
spillover. Therefore, policy that mirrors the wartime mobilization strategy above could
dramatically reduce the amount of land used for agriculture and limit human and livestock
exposure to wildlife. Further, while a loss in biodiversity may seem to limit the reservoir host
pool and decrease transmission capacity, the increase in the human transmission pool
consequently leads to a higher magnitude of any resultant outbreak and decreases the destructive
capacity of the virus.118 An international push to halt or limit deforestation tactics would in turn
protect human populations that live in close proximity to forest regions and decrease the
likelihood of future global outbreaks.
Deforestation is not the only destructive human method that heightens the interactions
between society and wildlife. The market of wild animal trade is another major contributor to the
risks of pandemics, one that the world is entirely too familiar with. The trade of wild animals is
used for both recreational and nutritional purposes, however, there is clear exploitation of these
practices that can have devastating results. Imposing strict bans or restrictions on the domestic
and international trade of wild animals, limiting wildlife markets, or providing zoonotic virus
screenings of wild animals can have transformative effects on human-environment interactions.
Though to ensure the equity of these measures, cultural reliance on wildlife nutrition must be
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taken into account when drafting legislation as many indigenous communities rely on bushmeat
for daily nutrition.119
The implementation of these preventative measures would have exponentially positive
effects on human-environmental relations, but they would be even more effective if nations and
institutions prioritized funding for early detection and control of zoonotic viruses. There are
existing programs worldwide that are dedicated to the detection and prevention of transmittable
diseases among wildlife populations, however, there is a severe lack of funding among these
sectors. A post-Covid world will likely see an increase in the funding for these projects as
humans begin to understand the implications of human-wildlife interactions. The prioritization of
“detection and control programs targeting outbreaks in their early stages would result in
considerable savings by reducing morbidity and mortality”.120 Further, the benefits of using these
programs would highly outweigh the benefits as the costs of pandemic reactionary adaptations
are exponentially higher than the costs of preparedness.
Conclusions
There is no one way to adapt to human-induced environmental crises. Decades of
interactions with the environment have dramatically altered both the conditions under which we
now must adapt and the processes in which we adapt to those conditions. The human adjustment
of socio-cultural adaptions is so varied across the geopolitical landscape that it can be difficult to
implement effective adaptive policy and even more challenging to ensure that policy is equitable
and accountable. However, if we are to reevaluate these systems of adaptation and distance
ourselves from the modes of resistance that have engrained themselves in adaptive strategy, we
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have a fighting chance in transforming the international society into one that embodies resilience
and equality. International systems must be robust in these changes, but if they are to comply
with the adaptive strategies they have already created and push for greater responsibility and
ambition, then we too can envision adaptations fit for the age of humans.

60
Bibliography
Adger, W.N. 2000. “Social and Ecological Resilience: Are They Related?” Progress in Human
Geography 24 (3): 347–64. doi:10.1191/030913200701540465.
Adger, Neil, W., Nigel W. Arnell, and Emma L. Tompkins. 2005. “Successful Adaptation to Climate
Change across Scales.” Global Environmental Change 15, no. 2 (2005): 77–86.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2004.12.005. Provides examples of successful human
adaptation and will be used as a reference for recommendations.
Adger, W. Neil, Suraje Dessai, Marisa Goulden, Mike Hulme, Irene Lorenzoni, Donald R. Nelson,
Lars Otto Naess, Johanna Wolf, and Anita Wreford. 2008. “Are There Social Limits to
Adaptation to Climate Change?” Climatic Change 93, no. 3-4 (2008): 335–54.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-008-9520-z.
Althor, Glenn, James E. Watson, and Richard A. Fuller. 2016. “Global Mismatch between Greenhouse
Gas Emissions and the Burden of Climate Change.” Scientific Reports 6, no. 1 (2016).
https://doi.org/10.1038/srep20281.
Anderson, Kevin, and Alice Bows. 2011. “Beyond ‘Dangerous’ Climate Change: Emission
Scenarios for a New World.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical,
Physical and Engineering Sciences 369, no. 1934: 20–44.
https://doi.org/10.1098/rsta.2010.0290.
Barbier, Edward B. 2010. Poverty, Development and Environment. Environment and Development
Economics, vol. 15, no. 6, p. 635-660.

61
Barkow, Jerome H., Leda Cosmides, and John Tooby. 1995. The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary
Psychology and the Generation of Culture. New York: Oxford University Press.
Berrang-Ford, Lea, Robbert Biesbroek, James D. Ford, Alexandra Lesnikowski, Andrew Tanabe,
Frances M. Wang, Chen Chen, et al. 2019. “Tracking Global Climate Change Adaptation among
Governments.” Nature Climate Change 9, no. 6 (2019): 440–49. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558019-0490-0.
Biermann, Frank, and Klaus Dingwerth. 2004. “Global Environmental Change and the Nation State.”
Global Environmental Politics 4, no. 1 (2004): 1–22.
https://doi.org/10.1162/152638004773730185.
Biesbroek, G. Robbert, Judith E. Klostermann, Catrien J. Termeer, and Pavel Kabat. 2013. “On the
Nature of Barriers to Climate Change Adaptation.” Regional Environmental Change 13, no. 5
(2013): 1119–29. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-013-0421-y.
Carver, Dominic. 2022. “What Were the Outcomes of COP26?” House of Commons Library, January
27, 2022. https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/what-were-the-outcomes-of-cop26/.
Chasek, Pamela S., David Leonard Downie, and Janet Welsh Brown. 2014. Global Environmental
Politics. [Electronic Resource]. Sixth edition. Dilemmas in World Politics. Westview Press, a
member of the Perseus Books Group. https://search-ebscohostcom.avoserv2.library.fordham.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cat00989a&AN=ford.3880523&s
ite=eds-live.

62
Clarke, Daniel and Stefan Dercon. 2015. Insurance, Credit, and Safety Nets for the Poor in a World of
Risk. In Financing for Overcoming Economic Insecurity, Nazrul Islam and Rob
Vos, eds. New York: Bloomsbury and United Nations.
Cohn, Roger. 2020. “Spillover Warning: How We Can Prevent the next Pandemic.” Yale E360.
https://e360.yale.edu/features/spillover-warning-how-we-can-prevent-the-next-pandemic-davidquammen.
“Coronavirus Disease (Covid-19).” 2022.World Health Organization. World Health Organization.
Accessed May 6, 2022. https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019.
Crutzen, Paul J., and Eugene F. Stoermer. 2021. “The ‘Anthropocene’ (2000).” The Anthropocene:
Politik—Economics—Society—Science 1: 19–21. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-82202-6_2.
Darwin, Charles, and John B. Alden. 1886. “Chapter 7: On the Races of Man.” Essay. In The Principal
Works of Charles Darwin.: The Origin of Species. the Descent of Man. New York: John B.
Alden, Publisher.
Davis, H., & Turpin, E. 2015. Art in the Anthropocene: Encounters among aesthetics, politics,
environments and epistemologies. Open Humanities
Press. http://openhumanitiespress.org/books/art-in-the-anthropocene
Delina, Laurence L., and Mark Diesendorf. 2013. “Is Wartime Mobilisation a Suitable Policy Model
for Rapid National Climate Mitigation?” Energy Policy 58 (2013): 371–80.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2013.03.036.

63
Dobson, Andrew P., Stuart L. Pimm, Lee Hannah, Les Kaufman, Jorge A. Ahumada, Amy W. Ando,
Aaron Bernstein, et al. 2020. “Ecology and Economics for Pandemic Prevention.” Science 369,
no. 6502 (2020): 379–81. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.abc3189.
“DOD Climate Risk Analysis,” 2021. U.S. Department of Defense.
https://media.defense.gov/2021/Oct/21/2002877353/-1/-1/0/DOD-CLIMATE-RISKANALYSIS-FINAL.PDF.
Dupuy, Jean-Pierre. 2015. A Short Treatise on the Metaphysics of Tsunamis. East Lansing: Michigan
State University Press.
Evans, Brad, and Julian Reid. 2013. “Dangerously Exposed: The Life and Death of the Resilient
Subject.” Resilience 1, no. 2 (2013): 83–98. https://doi.org/10.1080/21693293.2013.770703.
“Endangered Species Conservation.” WWF. World Wildlife Fund. https://www.worldwildlife.org/.
Faust, Christina L., Hamish I. McCallum, Laura S. Bloomfield, Nicole L. Gottdenker, Thomas R.
Gillespie, Colin J. Torney, Andrew P. Dobson, and Raina K. Plowright. 2018. “Pathogen
Spillover during Land Conversion.” Ecology Letters 21, no. 4: 471–83.
https://doi.org/10.1111/ele.12904.
Ferreira , Francisco H. G. 2021. “Inequality and Covid-19 – IMF F&D.” International Monetary Fund
- Homepage, 2021. https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2021/06/inequality-and-covid19-ferreira.htm.
“Fridays for Future.” Fridays For Future, January 25, 2022. https://fridaysforfuture.org/.

64
“Global Update: Climate Target Updates Slow as Science Demands Action.” Climate Action Tracker,
September 2021. https://climateactiontracker.org/publications/global-update-september-2021/.
Hall, Nina. 2015 “Money or Mandate? Why International Organizations Engage with the Climate
Change Regime.” Global Environmental Politics 15, no. 2: 79–97.
https://doi.org/10.1162/glep_a_00299
Heyd, Thomas. 2020. “Covid-19 and Climate Change in the Times of the Anthropocene.” The
Anthropocene Review 8, no. 1 (September 29, 2020): 21–36.
https://doi.org/10.1177/2053019620961799.
Holder, Josh. 2021. “Tracking Coronavirus Vaccinations around the World.” The New York Times.
The New York Times, January 29, 2021.
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/world/covid-vaccinations-tracker.html.
IPCC, 2021: Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to
the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [MassonDelmotte, V., P. Zhai, A. Pirani, S.L. Connors, C. Péan, S. Berger, N. Caud, Y. Chen, L.
Goldfarb, M.I. Gomis, M. Huang, K. Leitzell, E. Lonnoy, J.B.R. Matthews, T.K. Maycock, T.
Waterfield, O. Yelekçi, R. Yu, and B. Zhou (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press. In Press.
Islam, Nazrul, and John Winkel. 2017. “Climate Change and Social Inequality*.” UN.org. Department
of Economic & Social Affairs. https://www.un.org/esa/desa/papers/2017/wp152_2017.pdf.
Kerstin Schmidt, and Julia Fassit. 2019. Picturing America: Photography and the Sense of Place
Spatial Practices: An Interdisciplinary Series in Cultural History, Geography and Literature.

65
Leiden: Brill.
https://search.ebsohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=2090847&site=eds- live.
Kontoangelos, Konstantinos, Marina Economou, and Charalambos Papageorgiou. 2020. “Mental
Health Effects of Covid-19 Pandemia: A Review of Clinical and Psychological Traits.”
Psychiatry Investigation 17, no. 6: 491–505. https://doi.org/10.30773/pi.2020.0161.
“Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change” open for signature
December 11, 1997, United Nations Treaty Series Online,
https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf
Maizland, Lindsay, and Alice C. Hill. 2021. “Global Climate Agreements: Successes and Failures.”
Council on Foreign Relations. Council on Foreign Relations, November 7, 2021.
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/paris-global-climate-change-agreements.
Malm, Andreas. 2020. Corona, Climate, Chronic Emergency: War Communism in the Twenty-First
Century. London: Verso Books.
“Mary Mattingly.” Art Works for Change, 2014. https://www.artworksforchange.org/portfolio/marymattingly/.
Mattingly, Mary. 2013. “House and Universe- 2013.” Mary Mattingly - house and universe.
https://marymattingly.com/html/MATTINGLYHouseUniverse.html.
Mearns, Robin, and Andrew Norton. 2012. Social Dimensions of Climate Change: Equity and
Vulnerability in a Warming World. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

66
“Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States” open for signature December 26, 1933,
in force 26 December 1934, United Nations Treaty Series Online, registration no. 3802,
https://treaties.un.org/pages/showdetails.aspx?objid=0800000280166aef
Moran, Emilio F. 2019. Human Adaptability: An Introduction to Ecological Anthropology. London:
Routledge.
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2021. Climate change and international responses
increasing challenges to US National Security through 2040 §. National Intelligence Estimate.
Ord, Toby. 2021. The Precipice Existential Risk and the Future of Humanity. London: Bloomsbury
Publishing.
Parry, Jo-Ellen, and Anika Terton. “Trends in Adaptation Planning: Observations from a Recent
Stock-Taking Review.” Climate Change and Law Collection, n.d.
https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004322714_cclc_2016-0137-006.
Pritchard, Jonathan K., Joseph K. Pickrell, and Graham Coop. “The Genetics of Human Adaptation:
Hard Sweeps, Soft Sweeps, and Polygenic Adaptation.” Current Biology 20, no. 4 (2010).
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2009.11.055.
Quammen, David. Spillover: Animal Infections and the next Human Pandemic. London: Vintage,
2020.
Reid, Julian. “The Biopoliticization of Humanitarianism: From Saving Bare Life to Securing the
Biohuman in Post-Interventionary Societies.” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 4, no. 4
(2010): 391–411. https://doi.org/10.1080/17502971003700985.

67
Robinson, Mary. 2019. Climate Justice: Hope, Resilience, and the Fight for a Sustainable Future.
New York: Bloomsbury.
Rosen, Amanda M. “The Wrong Solution at the Right Time: The Failure of the Kyoto Protocol on
Climate Change.” Politics & Policy 43, no. 1 (2015): 30–58. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12105.
Rumsfeld, Donald. 2002, “Defense.gov News Transcript: DoD News Briefing – Secretary Rumsfeld
and Gen. Myers, United States Department of Defense (defense.gov)”,
https://archive.ph/20180320091111/http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?Trans
criptID=2636
Schipper, E. Lisa. 2009. “Meeting at the Crossroads?: Exploring the Linkages between Climate
Change Adaptation and Disaster Risk Reduction.” Climate and Development 1, no. 1 (2009): 16–
30. https://doi.org/10.3763/cdev.2009.0004.
Sheila Jasanoff. 1997. NGOs and the environment: From knowledge to action, Third World Quarterly,
18:3, 579-594, DOI: 10.1080/01436599714885, 9.
Simon Nicholson, and Paul Wapner. 2016. Global Environmental Politics : From Person to Planet.
London: Routledge. https://search-ebscohostcom.avoserv2.library.fordham.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edsebk&AN=1360834&site=edslive.
Stan Cox. 2021. The Path to a Livable Future : A New Politics to Fight Climate Change, Racism, and
the Next Pandemic. Open Media Series. San Francisco: City Lights Publishers. https://searchebscohostcom.avoserv2.library.fordham.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=2914071&site=edslive.

68
Steffen, Will, Paul J. Crutzen, and John R. McNeill. 2007. “The Anthropocene: Are Humans Now
Overwhelming the Great Forces of Nature.” AMBIO: A Journal of the Human Environment 36,
no. 8 (2007): 614–21. https://doi.org/10.1579/0044-7447(2007)36[614:taahno]2.0.co;2.
Stiglitz, Joseph. 2020. “Conquering the great divide,” Finance and Development, (2020): 17-19
Tallberg, Jonas, Thomas Sommerer, Theresa Squatrito, and Magnus Lundgren. “The Performance of
International Organizations: A Policy Output Approach.” Journal of European Public Policy 23,
no. 7 (2016): 1077–96. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2016.1162834.
“The COVID-19 Pandemic from a Global Environmental Health Perspective.” National Institute of
Environmental Health Sciences. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2020.
https://www.niehs.nih.gov/research/programs/geh/geh_newsletter/2020/6/articles/the_covid19_p
andemic_from_a_global_environmental_health_perspective.cfm.
“The World to Come: Art in the Age of the Anthropocene: University of Michigan Museum of Art.”
2019. The World to Come: Art in the Age of the Anthropocene | University of Michigan
Museum of Art, 2019. https://umma.umich.edu/exhibitions/2019/the-world-to-come-art-in-theage-of-the-anthropocene.
United Nations. 2016. World Economic and Social Survey 2016: Climate Change Resilience: An
Opportunity for Reducing Inequalities §. https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/wpcontent/uploads/sites/45/publication/WESS_2016_Report.pdf.
University of Notre Dame. “Rankings // Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative // University of
Notre Dame.” Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative, 2019. https://gain.nd.edu/ourwork/country-index/rankings/.

69
Waters, C. et.al. 2019. Working Group on the ‘Anthropocene.’ Subcommission on quaternary
stratigraphy. Retrieved April 13, 2022, from http://quaternary.stratigraphy.org/workinggroups/anthropocene/
“Who Coronavirus (COVID-19) Dashboard.” World Health Organization. World Health Organization.
Accessed May 6, 2022. https://covid19.who.int/.
Wilson, Edward O. 1993. “New York Times Magazine - 30 May 93.” Is Humanity Suicidal? New
York Times Magazine. http://large.stanford.edu/publications/coal/references/wilson/.
Zambrano-Monserrate, Manuel A., María Alejandra Ruano, and Luis Sanchez-Alcalde. 2020. “Indirect
Effects of COVID-19 on the Environment.” Science of The Total Environment 728 (2020):
138813. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2020.138813.
Zhou, P., Yang, XL., Wang, XG. et al. 2020. A pneumonia outbreak associated with a new
coronavirus of probable bat origin. Nature 579, 270–273. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-0202012-7

